New Wave of Mobilization and Conscripting Prisoners in Russia
Russian prisoners that could forego legal sentences for serving in Ukraine. Photo: The Insider
On Oct. 2, Vladimir Putin signed a law that allows criminals to join the army in return for immunity. According to independent Russian media, Istories, the government wants to conscript 40 percent of 60,000 prisoners with pre-trial detention status. More specifically, 100 people will be conscripted from each of 210 pre-trial detention facilities, in order to make up an entire so-called Storm-Z unit, a prisoners military division of 20,000. Remarkably, this law follows the new wave of mobilization, as Putin also mandated the conscription of 133,000 civilians as part of the autumn draft, which began on October 1.
The crux of the law is that prisoners who choose to serve in the Russian military will receive immunity from criminal prosecution. This policy mirrors the earlier, semi-official practice of conscripting prisoners through mercenary groups, such as the Wagner Group, which offered reduced sentences. By mid-February 2023, US intelligence reported that the Wagner Group incurred over 30,000 casualties in Ukraine, most of them being convicts. Although Putin’s new law opens the door to the mass recruitment of prisoners, it does not apply universally. Reports indicate that while those convicted of minor offenses are conscripted, generally, those convicted of more severe crimes—such as terrorism or sexual offenses—are still excluded from the draft.
Wagner Group mercenaries, including former convicts, in Ukraine. Photo: ABC News
The question of who qualifies reflects a broader concern about the Russian legal system blurring the line between legal punishment and military service. This is particularly troubling, considering the nature of the crimes committed by prisoners already involved in Ukraine’s combat operations. For example, Wagner mercenaries recruited from prisons have tortured civilians, executed prisoners of war, and participated in looting.
Moreover, upon returning from the frontlines, many former prisoners who were granted immunity for their service were implicated in numerous violent crimes in civilian life, often exacerbated by Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). For instance, in March 2023, a former Wagner fighter was arrested on suspicion of killing an 85-year-old pensioner in the Kirov region just weeks after his return from Ukraine. In response to the recidivism issue, Putin argued that “The negative consequences are minimal,” claiming its rate among the convicts who went to Ukraine was only “0.4%”, while for ex-convicts in general “in some cases it goes up to 40%."
The widespread involvement of criminals in the military has led to growing concerns, not only about the behavior of these soldiers on the battlefield but also about the moral fabric of the Russian army. This has become a major focus point, in the context of adherence to international law, which prohibits forced labor per Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If prisoners are compelled to join the military without true freedom of choice, it could be considered a form of forced labor. Furthermore, conscripting individuals from pre-trial detention, especially if they have not yet been convicted of a crime, violates their legal rights to a fair trial and due process.
Putin’s decision to conscript prisoners is a response to a critical shortage of manpower in the Russian military. With an estimated 350,000 men already mobilized since the war began, Russia needs to reinforce its lines, particularly as fighting intensifies. Putin’s move to conscript prisoners comes at a critical juncture in the war, as a Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region has stretched the frontline to over 1,500 kilometers. The addition of new prisoners and civilian soldiers highlights the challenge for the Kremlin as it holds its gains in the Donbass region while responding to Ukrainian advances in Kursk.
In addition, mobilizing prisoners is a démarche that Putin hopes will help minimize public backlash. Conscripting civilians provoked mass protests and diminished public support for the war, particularly in Russia’s urban centers. However, the same does not hold for prisoners, who remain largely invisible to the broader population. By focusing on incarcerated individuals, the Kremlin avoids igniting the kind of civil unrest that characterized earlier waves of conscription, when an estimated 1 million Russian men fled the country en masse to avoid being drafted.
Putin’s law allowing prisoners to trade jail time for military service is a gamble that may temporarily alleviate Russia’s manpower shortages, but it comes with significant risks. Not only does it raise ethical questions, but it also reflects the increasingly desperate measures the Kremlin is willing to take to maintain its war effort. As the war drags on, the long-term consequences of this policy—both for Russian society and for the military—remain to be seen.